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RECOVERY OF UNAUTHORIZED TAXES:
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Peter W. Hogg*
I. THE LAW BEFORE KINGSTREET
Where a tax has been paid to government under a statute that is
subsequently held to be unconstitutional, can the tax be recovered
by the taxpayer? It seems obvious that the answer should be yes.
The government's right to the tax was destroyed by the holding of
unconstitutionality, and the tax should be refunded to the
taxpayer. Before 2007 in Canada, neither governments nor
courts embraced this simple solution. Governments usually tried
to retain taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute, and
taxpayers were often unsuccessful in enforcing recovery in the
courts. What was the problem?
One problem was the rule of restitution law that payments made
under a mistake of law were irrecoverable. That was a barrier to
the recovery of unconstitutional taxes. However, that rule was
repudiated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1989,1 and has now
disappeared from the law of restitution, not only for the recovery
of illegal taxes, but for restitutionary claims generally. But another
problem remained. In Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989),2 La
Forest J. in the Supreme Court of Canada said that there was a
special rule of public law applicable only to the recovery of
unconstitutional taxes. The special rule was that unconstitutional
*

Peter W. Hogg, Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University;
Scholar in Residence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP. The paper is a revised
version of my account of the law in P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
5th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2007) at 58.8. I am also indebted to J.D.

McCamus, "Restitutionary Liability of Public Authorities in Canada" in C.E.S.
1.

Rickett and R. Grantham, eds., Structure and Justificationin PrivateLaw: Essays
for Peter Birks (Oxford: Hart Publishing Co., forthcoming), p. 291.
Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1133, 59
D.L.R. (4th) 218. Accord, David Securities v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia
(1992), 175 C.L.R. 353 (H.C.A.); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council,

[1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.).
2.

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 at pp. 1204-1206, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
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taxes were irrecoverable. The reason for the rule was that "fiscal
chaos" would otherwise result. This was an obiter dictum: recovery
was denied in the case because a new valid retroactive tax had
replaced the unconstitutional tax. And the special rule was agreed
to by only two other judges. Nevertheless, as the considered view
of a respected judge, it could not be disregarded, and until the
Kingstreet decision in 2007, 3 which will be the main topic of this
article, the court did not repudiate the dictum, which left the state
of the law in doubt.
The newly announced special rule of irrecoverability seemed to
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Amax
Potash v. Government of Saskatchewan (1977). 4 In that case, the
court struck down a statute that purported to bar recovery by
taxpayers of an unconstitutional tax. To be sure, the court did not
decide that the unconstitutional tax was recoverable by the
taxpayers, but the decision only made sense on the assumption
that the taxes would have been recoverable at common law. Aside
from this precedent, the suggested rule was criticized by
commentators 5 on the ground that the rule was opposed to
fundamental constitutional principles and sound policy.
II. THE DECISION IN KINGSTREET
The criticisms of the suggested Crown immunity were fully
accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kingstreet
Investments v. New Brunswick (2007).6 New Brunswick had for
many years been levying a "user charge" on night clubs that were
licensed to sell liquor. The night clubs sued the province to recover
the charges they had paid, claiming that the charges were
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs
that the charges were unconstitutional, because they were really
indirect taxes. 7 And the court rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs should not recover because they had not actually borne
the burden of the taxes, having passed it on as part of the price of
the drinks that they sold to their customers. Passing-on, the court8
said, was not a defence to an action to recover unauthorized taxes.
3.
4.
5.

Infra, footnote 6.
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, 71 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
E.g., P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., supplemented

(Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at 55.7.
6.

[2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 276 D.L.R. (4th) 342. Bastarache J. wrote the opinion of the

7.
8.

court.
Ibid., at para. 4.
Ibid., at paras. 42-51. One reason given was that it is impossible to ascertain the
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Those rulings made it unavoidable to decide the question whether
the plaintiffs were to be defeated by La Forest J.'s suggested
Crown immunity. The court did decide the question, emphatically
rejecting the immunity rule, and substituting the opposite rule,
namely, that unconstitutional taxes were recoverable by the
taxpayers who had paid them.
Bastarache J., who wrote the opinion of the court in Kingstreet,
proceeded from the premise that the governing constitutional
principle is that the Crown may not levy a tax without legislative
authority. This principle, enshrined in the Bill of Rights of 1688, 9
ensures not merely that the executive branch is subject to the rule
of law, but also that the executive branch must call the legislative
branch into session in order to raise taxes (and vote supply). This
principle would be "undermined" if a tax could be imposed
without legislative authority and then could simply be retained by
the Crown. 10 An analogous constitutional principle allows the
Crown an absolute right to recover expenditures that have been
made without legislative authority." The spending of money and
the raising of money are "two sides of the same coin." Just as the
Crown is entitled to recover unauthorized expenditures, so the
Crown should be obliged to repay unauthorized taxes. 12 As for the
concern that governmental finances would be disrupted by the
return of unauthorized taxes, that was a problem for governments
to solve, not the innocent taxpayers. Bastarache J. pointed out that
a court striking down an unconstitutional tax could suspend the
declaration of invalidity for a period of time to allow the
government to address the fiscal problem that the decision would
cause. 13 And he noted that the problem could sometimes be solved
by the enactment of a new, valid, retroactive tax, as had occurred
ultimate burden of a tax. Of course, the finding that the taxes were indirect
(previous note) entailed a finding that the taxes were likely to be passed on by the
taxpayers to their customers: Hogg, supra, footnote 5, at 31.2.
9. (U.K.), 1 Will. & Mar., c. 2, s. 4; see also Bowles v. Bank of England, [1913] 1 Ch.
57 (resolution of legislative committee, approved by House of Commons, but not
by House of Lords and King, cannot authorize levy of tax).
10. Kingstreet, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 14-15 and 19-22, quoting from the
previous edition of Hogg, supra, footnote 5.
11. Auckland Harbour Bd. v. The King, [1924] A.C. 318 at pp. 326-27 (P.C. (N.Z.));
The King v. Toronto Terminals Ry. Co, [1948] Ex. C.R. 563; R. v. Breckenridge

Speedway Ltd., [1970] S.C.R. 175; P.W. Hogg and P.J. Monahan, Liability of the
Crown, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000) at 10.1(c).
12. Kingstreet, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 23-24.
13. This was done in Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, 165 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
where the ruling that Ontario's probate fee was an unconstitutional tax was
suspended for six months. The Legislature followed up by enacting a valid "estate
administration tax" at the same rate as the probate fees and made it retroactive to
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in the Air Canadacase. 14 (In fact, after the decision in Kingstreet,
the New Brunswick Legislature enacted a new retroactive direct
tax to enable the government to retain the money that had been
unconstitutionally levied.) 15
Having decided that taxes levied without valid legislative
authority could be recovered, Bastarache J. went on to determine
the juridical basis of the recovery. He held that, because of the
constitutional principles that govern the levy of taxes, the recovery
' 6
of unconstitutional taxes is "a matter of constitutional right."'
Separate and apart from the private-law cause of action for unjust
enrichment, the restitution of taxes is a "public law remedy."' 1 7 The
right of recovery depends solely "on the objective consideration ''of8
whether the tax was exacted without proper legal authority."
Moreover, the same right of recovery is available, not only in the
case where taxes were levied under an unconstitutional statute (as
in this case), but also where taxes were levied without legislative
authority in the administrative-law sense. 19 Both situations offend
the same constitutional principle that taxes may only be levied by
statute.

14.
15.

1950, when the invalid probate fees were introduced: Hogg, supra, footnote 5, at
31.8.
Supra, footnote 2. This also occurred after the Eurig decision, ibid., and after the
Kingstreet case itself.
An Act to Amend the Liquor Control Act, S.N.B. 2007, c. 23 (retroactive to

March 1, 1998).
16.

Kingstreet, supra, footnote 6, at para. 34. This is generally the position outside
Canada: McKesson Group v. Florida (1990), 496 U.S. 18 (invoking due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Commr. of State Revenue v. Royal Insurance
Australia (1994), 182 C.L.R. 51; Woolwich Equitable Building Soc. v. Inland
Revenue Commrs., [1993] A.C. 70 (H.L.); and even in Quebec: Abel Skiver Farm
Corp. v.Ste-Foy, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 403, 54 N.R. 345; Willmor Discount Corp. v.

Vaudreuil (City), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 210, 61 Q.A.C. 141.
Ibid., at para. 40. It is not clear what the significance is of treating the recovery of
unconstitutional taxes as a special public-law remedy, since the mistaken belief of
the taxpayer or the passing on of the tax or the absence of duress would not be
defences to a private claim of unjust enrichment.
18. Ibid., at para. 53.
19. Ibid., at paras. 54-58. These passages are not perfectly clear in that they are
directed only to the issues of protest and duress. However, the constitutional
principle of no taxation without legislative authority is equally violated whether
the taxing law is itself invalid (as a matter of constitutional law) or whether the
language of a valid statute does not authorize the levy of the tax (as a matter of
17.

administrative law). Accord, Woolwich Equitable Building Soc. v. Inland Revenue

Commrs., supra, footnote 16, at p. 172, Lord Goff (applying constitutional
principle to permit recovery of administrative-law ultra vires taxes).
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III. LIMITATION PERIODS
What about limitation periods? Do they restrict the right to
recover invalid taxes? It will be recalled that, in the Amax Potash
case, 20 the Supreme Court had struck down a law that purported
to bar recovery of an unconstitutional tax. However, in Kingstreet,
Bastarache J. drew a distinction between a law that was enacted for
the purpose of barring the recovery of an unconstitutional tax
(Amax Potash) and a pre-existing law of general application that
imposes limitation periods on causes of action. There was no
reason, he said, why a general limitation statute (assuming its
terms were apt to apply to the action for recovery of taxes? should
not be effective to bar stale claims for recovery of taxes. 2 In this
case, New Brunswick's limitation of actions statute contained a
number of specific limitation periods for particular kinds of causes
of action and a residuary clause imposing a limitation period of six
years on all causes of action not otherwise provided for. That
residuary limitation period applied to the plaintiffs' action for
recovery of the invalid taxes, and limited the claim to those taxes
paid during the six years preceding the commencement of the
action. Taxes that had been paid more than six years before the
commencement of the action were barred from recovery by the
limitation period.
IV. CONCLUSION
Kingstreet decides that taxes levied without statutory authority
are recoverable by the taxpayer as a matter of constitutional right.
The absence of statutory authority in the case resulted from the
taxing statute being unconstitutional (constitutional ultra vires).
However, it is clear from the reasoning that the same principle
would apply to the case where the statute was constitutional but its
language did not authorize the tax that was in fact levied
(administrative ultra vires). The court insisted that the right of
recovery was a public-law cause of action that was separate and
apart from the private-law right of restitution for unjust
enrichment. It is not clear from the reasons what (if any)
practical consequences flow from the distinction. The important
part of the reasoning was to sweep away La Forest J.'s suggested
Crown immunity, and once that was done it seems likely that the
law of unjust enrichment, now liberated from its mistake-of-law
20.
21.

Supra, footnote 4.
Kingstreet, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 59-61.
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straitjacket, would also provide a right to recover unauthorized
taxes.
The concern about the fiscal consequences to government
remains a valid one. However, the application of general limitation
periods to the cause of action for recovery will restrict the size of
the claims that can be made by taxpayers. And the remedy of a
new, valid, retroactive tax will often be available to nullify the
liability altogether if the competent legislative body so wishes.
Indeed, that was the solution adopted in New Brunswick to
overcome the liability imposed by this case.

